Research on the relationship between managerial overconfidence and M&A decision-making-moderating role based on board vigilance
e
12 dic 2022
INFORMAZIONI SU QUESTO ARTICOLO
Pubblicato online: 12 dic 2022
Pagine: 1043 - 1052
Ricevuto: 09 apr 2022
Accettato: 19 nov 2022
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/amns.2021.2.00322
Parole chiave
© 2022 Zhang Quan et al., published by Sciendo
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Correlation analysis
| Merger | 1.0000 | |||||||
| Oc | 0.0493 | 1.0000 | ||||||
| Bd | 0.0340 | −0.0267 | 1.0000 | |||||
| Size | 0.0556 | −0.0965 | 0.0375 | 1.0000 | ||||
| Average | −0.0220 | 0.0480 | −0.0239 | 0.1856 |
1.0000 | |||
| Cash | −0.0104 | −0.0072 | 0.0435 | −0.2778 |
−0.0441 | 1.0000 | ||
| Cash comp | 0.1451 |
−0.0389 | −0.0304 | 0.2854 |
0.0199 | −0.0372 | 1.0000 | |
| Lev | 0.0384 | −0.0064 | −0.0626 | 0.0720 | 0.0401 | −0.0330 | 0.0185 | 1.0000 |
The impact of managers’ overconfidence on M&A decision and the moderating effect of the board of directors’ diligence
| Oc | 0.7246 |
−3.3092 (2.1999) | 0.4200 |
−1.9747 (1.2562) | 0.3200 |
−1.6247 (1.2262) |
| Size | 0.0258 (0.0669) | 0.0179 (0.0660) | 0.0171 (0.0388) | 0.0110 (0.0384) | 0.0071 (0.0328) | 0.0100 (0.0324) |
| Bd | −1.3316 (0.8780) | −0.7984 (0.5035) | −0.6232 (0.3035) | |||
| Ocbd | 1.7055 |
1.0138 |
1.0124 |
|||
| Average | −0.0270 (0.0259) | −0.0231 (0.0255) | −0.0155 (0.0149) | −0.0135 (0.0147) | −0.0125 (0.0119) | −0.0135 (0.0123) |
| Cash | 0.0099 (0.1875) | −0.0107 (0.1881) | 0.0077 (0.1107) | −0.0025 (0.1112) | 0.0067 (0.1003) | −0.0023 (0.1010) |
| Cashcomp | 0.0012 |
0.0013 |
0.0011 |
0.0012 |
0.0011 |
0.0010 |
| Lev | 0.3360 (0.3036) | 0.3599 (0.3094) | 0.1959 (0.1733) | 0.2121 (0.1782) | 0.1059 (0.1233) | 0.2011 (0.1722) |
| Constant | 0.6688 (1.7311) | 3.8381 (2.6362) | 0.3741 (1.0050) | 2.3127 (1.5183) | 0.3141 (1.0030) | 2.1127 (1.2183) |
| Observations | 935 | 935 | 935 | 935 | 935 | 935 |
Descriptive statistical result
| Merger | 1 | 0 | 0.80 | 0.40 | 935 |
| Oc | 1 | 0 | 0.96 | 0.20 | 935 |
| Bd | 3.67 | 0.69 | 2.27 | 0.05 | 935 |
| Size | 25.38 | 14.00 | 21.76 | 1.44 | 935 |
| Average | 59 | 35.6 | 47.44 | 3.28 | 935 |
| Cash | 8.45 | −0.01 | 0.21 | 0.40 | 935 |
| Cashcomp | 6,600,000 | 6,700 | 720,526.90 | 787,884.20 | 935 |
| Lev | 11.51 | −0.19 | 0.54 | 0.51 | 935 |
Variable definition and calculation method
| Dependent variable | Acquisition decision | Merger | The listed company initiates the M&A in year |
| Independent variable | Managers are over-confident | Oc | During the sample period, if the CEO of the acquirer compares the forecast earnings per share to the actual earnings per share at least once, the high company manager is regarded as the overconfidence manager, and the value is 1, while the value is 0. |
| Regulated Variable | Board vigilance | Bd | Board vigilance in year t is expressed by the natural logarithm of the number of board meetings in year t. |
| Controlle d variable | Company size | Size | Natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of t − 1. |
| Executive age | Avage | The average age of acquirer executives | |
| Cash stock | Cash | Cash stock of the purchaser at the end of t − 1/total assets at the end of t − 1. | |
| Cash compensation | Cashcomp | Total compensation of the acquiring party's CEO. | |
| Asset-liability ratio | Lev | Total liabilities in year t/total assets in year t, take the average asset-liability ratio at the end of the period. | |