Research on the relationship between managerial overconfidence and M&A decision-making-moderating role based on board vigilance
e
12 dic 2022
INFORMAZIONI SU QUESTO ARTICOLO
Pubblicato online: 12 dic 2022
Pagine: 1043 - 1052
Ricevuto: 09 apr 2022
Accettato: 19 nov 2022
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/amns.2021.2.00322
Parole chiave
© 2022 Zhang Quan et al., published by Sciendo
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
This paper uses the A-share data of listed companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2012 to 2016 and uses the Xtlogit model to test the relationship between managers’ overconfidence and M&A (mergers and acquisitions) decisions, and also to test the relationship between directors’ vigilance and managers’ overconfidence and M&A decisions, and the corresponding robustness test was carried out using the Xtprobit model. The study found that managers’ overconfidence can significantly promote M&A, and board vigilance can significantly moderate the relationship between managers’ overconfidence and M&A decision-making, and can inhibit M&A caused by managers’ overconfidence.