An Exploration of the Ideas of Marx and Engels on Historical Materialism

The elaboration of the problem of the movement of the basic contradictions in society can be roughly divided into three aspects: the problem of the contradictory movement of the productive forces and the relations of production, the problem of the decisive role of economic factors in the historical development of society, and the problem of the relative independence of the superstructure and its counteraction to the economic base. 1)

The problem of the contradictory movement of the productive forces and the relations of production

Productive forces are material forces formed by human beings in the process of transforming nature and society, and they are the material basis for the survival and development of human beings [15]. Productive forces have an important role in determining the relations of production, which are the relationships between people and people and between people and things formed in the process of human beings transforming the world. Changes in the relations of production have a dynamic counteraction to the productive forces.

The question of the dynamics of social development is the centralized expression of the idea of historical synergy, the idea that history is formed by the joint action of many factors, that is, that the synergy of history creates human history. The idea of historical synergy was put forward in response to the distortion of historical materialism by bourgeois scholars and the “youth wing” of the German Social Democratic Party. It was pointed out that there are many factors driving historical development, and that the basic contradictions of society are the fundamental driving force of historical development, while at the same time various other factors also play a role in driving historical development. People make history under very definite preconditions and conditions, of which the basic contradictions of society are the most fundamental driving force of historical development, while class struggle, science and technology, violent revolution and reform are all important forces driving historical development.

The question of the creator of history and the question of the historical role of the masses of the people are important questions answered by the ideas of historical materialism of Marx and Engels. 1)

The people are the main body of history and the creators of history

Individual will and class will are dialectical, individual will reflects the level of social and economic development at that time, the economic factor is the fundamental factor, however, due to the individual’s understanding, ideological concepts are different, therefore, the individual will is also different, the individual forces in the parallelogram have a different nature and direction, and in the process of the historical development, everyone’s individual will wants to be realized, the individual wills of the individual wills of the individual will of each other There will be confrontation and conflict, and two different forces confronting each other will produce a new force, which is the historical result. Therefore, the individual wills usually have a greater influence in the formation of history if they represent the advanced productive forces, while the backward classes have little influence in the formation of history. The final outcome of history differs from any one individual will, but it does come about under the combined influence of each. Although history is shaped by a multiplicity of forces, the power of the masses is directional. The masses of the people represent the will of society, are the main body of social history, and are the creators of history.

In evolutionary game theory, the replication dynamic equation is a common mathematical tool used to describe the evolution of different strategies in a population during an evolutionary game [16]. Based on the concept of “replication” in biology, this equation simulates that participants in a game choose strategies based on their performance and gains, and update their strategies based on their relative success. The replication dynamics equations are usually represented by differential equations or difference equations, and then the dynamics of the strategies are obtained by solving these equations, thus revealing important properties of the game system such as stability and equilibrium.

Let B = {b₁, ⋯, b_n} be the set of strategies chosen by a participating subject, and W = (b, b′) be the return of a participating subject when he and his opponent choose strategies b and b′ respectively. N_t denotes the number of participating subjects, n_t denotes the number of participating subjects when choosing strategy b in t, and nt′ is the number of participating subjects when choosing strategy b′, so the proportion of participating subjects choosing strategy b in the whole is: (1)st(b)=ntnt+nt′=ntNt

The expected payoff for a participating subject choosing Strategy b is: (2)wt(b)=st(b)wt(b,b)+st(b′)wt(b,b′)

The average return for all participating subjects is: (3)w¯t(b)=st(b)wt(b)+st(b′)wt(b′)

Then the replication dynamic equation can be expressed as: (4)F(b)=s(b)[w(b)−w¯(b)]

An evolutionarily stable strategy is a strategy that can persist in a population and is not easily replaced by other strategies after an evolutionary process in a given environment [17]. When the majority of participants in a population adopt a certain strategy, any small percentage of mutants who choose a different strategy will not succeed in entering the population. When confronted with the laws of biological or social selection, individuals can find their evolutionarily stable strategy by constantly experimenting with and continually refining different strategies. Eventually, when the majority of individuals in the population adopt a particular strategy and any mutant that tries to change the strategy fails to achieve higher gains, this state is called an evolutionarily stable equilibrium and the corresponding strategy is the evolutionarily stable strategy.

If, at the beginning stage, a population chooses one strategy b and, at the same time, a small fraction of the heterozygous invading population ε chooses another strategy b′, then the evolutionary stabilization strategy has the following settings:

When all b′ ≠ b, for very small positive numbers ε, the strategy in the following conditions is ESS: (5)w(b′,(1−ε)b+εb′)<w(b,(1−ε)b+εb′)

When the expected returns are linear with respect to the variables, the equivalent derivation of the evolutionary stabilization strategy can be expressed in Equation (6): (6)(1−ε)w(b′,b)+εw(b′,b′)<(1−ε)w(b,b)+εw(b,b′)

where w is the gain value of the game subject. ε is the probability that the subject of the game is invaded, 1 − ε is the probability that the subject of the game encounters the subject of the choice of strategy b.

It is easy to know that if ε tends to 0 formula can be constant, so for ∀b′ ≠ b. 1)

w(b, b) > w(b′, b).

Where (1) means that the subject of the game who chooses strategy b has a higher payoff than if he chooses strategy b′. (2) means that if the opponent chooses strategy b and the subject of the game chooses strategy b or b′ with the same payoff, the payoff will be higher if the opponent chooses strategy b′.

Marx did not give a clear definition of institutions in a general sense, but his discourse on institutions permeates the whole of historical materialism. He did not limit institutions to the economic sphere alone, but viewed them as the endogenous and stable outcome of a game process in either the economic or the political sphere. This stable equilibrium results from the process of human interaction, and institutions are merely the product of the interaction that has existed so far between individuals. He used the concept of system in different ways and at different levels, such as “ownership of the means of production” and “capitalist system”. Marx not only used the concept of system extensively, but also analyzed the emergence of system more comprehensively and profoundly. In his view, system belongs to the category of superstructure and is determined by social relations. The emergence of institutions is fundamentally to harmonize the contradictions between people. As Engels pointed out in his analysis of the emergence of the State, the society is caught in an irresolvable self-contradiction, split into irreconcilable opposites and powerless to get rid of these opposites.

The institutions analyzed by Marx apply to the third case, which Schott calls “institutions that sustain inequality”, “which are created in order to maintain inequality in its original state among various economic actors”. Institutions are “something that serves the interests of certain groups at the expense of others or long-term social interests.” Such a system is similar to property rights or inheritance law, which establishes a practice whereby property or the right to use it is not violated. The relevant circumstance that leads to the creation of such a system that maintains inequality is: “In such a case, an equilibrium vector of benefits is designated as the original state and thus given a particular importance, and all other analyses take this as their starting point.” We illustrate this by analyzing Ullmann-Magali’s “game of inequality maintenance”.

Suppose this game is a repeated game where participants A and B play the same 2*2 matrix over and over again. There are two non-cooperative equilibria (R₁, C₁) and (R₂, C₂), each of which favors a different participant. Based on the characteristics of the coordination game, we assume that if the game is repeated, the participants will have a certain convention for their behavior, which will dictate which of these equilibria they will take each time the game is played.

Marx argued that the history of all societies to date is the history of class struggle. Due to the different appropriation of the means of production by people in social relations, different classes and interest groups are bound to be formed, and conflicts of interest are bound to arise between different subjects of interest in order to safeguard their own needs. Class struggle - the manifestation of conflict between different interest groups - is the direct cause of institutional change. Historically, “freemen and slaves, nobles and commoners, lords and serfs, guild masters and helpers, in a word, oppressors and oppressed, have always been in opposition to each other, engaged in constant, sometimes hidden and sometimes open struggles, and each of these struggles has ended with the whole society being transformed by a revolution or with the classes struggling to die together.

Suppose that a labor market exists. The wage is set to 1 and the price of corn is set to P. A member can engage in three types of activities: he can process his own corn stock and use his own labor to produce corn; he can hire someone else to process his corn stock, paying him a wage: and he can sell his labor to someone else at the prevailing wage to process their corn. For member i, let Xⁱ be the amount of corn he produces by processing his own corn seed; Yⁱ be the amount of corn he produces by hiring workers to process his corn seed; and Zⁱ be the amount of labor he sells in the labor market. Then his net income is: (7)(P−Pa)Xi+[P−(Pa+L)]Yi+Zi

His survival needs are: (8)(P−Pa)Xi+[P−(Pa+L)]Yi+Zi≥Pb

In addition, there exists a constraint on members from initial ownership of tangible capital. That is, given initial capital, the constraint on each member is to go for the level of maize assets that can be maintained for the capital he received ex ante. Under this assumption, the amount of capital that member i must own in order to maize assets at level Xⁱ for himself and hire others to maize at level Yⁱ is PaX′ + PaY′. His capital constraint is: (9)PaXi+PaYi≤Pwi

and there exists the constraint that member i cannot use more than the amount of labor he possesses, viz: (10)LXi+Zi≤1

Conditional on producing subsistence income and satisfying his capital constraint and labor constraint, member i objective is to minimize the labor he spends. Thus his utility maximization problem can be expressed as follows: choice Xⁱ, Yⁱ, Zⁱ, constraints: (11)(P−Pa)Xi+[P−(Pa+L)]Yi+Zi≥Pb (12)Pa Xi+Pa Yi≤Pwi(Pi) (13)LXi+Zi≤1

and satisfies the constraint that: variable Xⁱ, Yⁱ, Zⁱ is nonnegative. This is called the optimization problem for member i. (Pⁱ) As a result of the optimal behavior of the members and their initial assets, they end up in different class positions, and the class structure under the corn economy is shown in Table 1. The definition of class is realized through the organic combination of initial information possession and individual rationality. He believed that class was a group of people whose “whole members are connected in a similar way to the labour process.” “Under capitalist conditions, there are three main classes: “All those who sell their labour power for the sake of living constitute a class; All those who wage labor constitute a class; All those who work for themselves, who neither sell their labor nor hire it, constitute the third class.” These three major classes can be subdivided into the five levels shown in the table if one considers the skills of the individual. The formation of a class structure always corresponds to exploitation and wealth. On the basis of wealth, each individual makes choices that maximize his or her own interests, and the rational choices of individuals at a given level of wealth will maximize their gains. And, each class is the best choice for maximizing benefits. But no matter what, the class that sells labor is more or less bound to struggle with the class that hires labor.

Consider a society in which there exists a person whose property is wⁱ = ba/(1 − a). He must have utilized all of his capital, or else he could have earned more by hiring someone to use his excess capital labor, and thus further reduce his own labor time. So, according to the structural analysis of class formation, this must be the case if his optimal solution is 〈Xⁱ, 0, 0〉 (independent craftsman): (14)axi=wi=ba/(1−a) (15)xi=b/(1−a)

Therefore, his labor time is: (16)Lx−1=bL/(1−a)=λb=SNLT

This last equation follows because the labor of the corn is worth λ = L/(1 − a), so that Lxⁱ = bL/(1 − a) = λb = SNLT is the amount of time that the members i work for exactly the amount of necessary labor time for the society.

Marx was also aware of the difficulties and saw that there was a conflict between the interests of individual members and those of the whole as a whole. The organization of the proletarians as a class, and thus as a political party, was constantly undermined by workers competing with each other. Marx believed that the history of all societies to date has been the history of class struggle. Because of the different appropriation of the means of production by people in social relations, different classes and interest groups are bound to form, and conflicts of interest are bound to arise between different subjects of interest in order to defend their needs. Class struggle - the expression of conflict between different interest groups - is the direct cause of institutional change. Historically, freemen and slaves, nobles and commoners, lords and serfs, guild masters and helpers, in a word, oppressors and oppressed, have always been in opposition to each other, engaged in constant, sometimes hidden and sometimes open, struggles, and each of these struggles has ended with the entire society being transformed by a revolution or with the classes struggling to come to an end.

The simulation analyzes the sensitivity of the main parameters to the evolutionary game under the stable equilibrium point A(0,0) when the labor market supply exceeds the demand (W = 2) and let S = 8. Keeping the initial parameters unchanged, the probability of low input of capital and labor management is x = 0.58, and the probability of high propensity of workers to leave is y = 0.58. Adjusting the initial values, the corresponding evolution results are obtained, and the numerical simulation of the market labor force in the case of supply exceeding demand is shown in Fig. 1, in which (a) to (c) are L₂ (L₂ is the capital gain of low propensity of workers to leave in the case of low input), R₂ (R₂ is the capital gain of low propensity of workers to leave in the case of high input), r (r is the loss coefficient). The cost of meeting workers’ growth needs under low inputs of capital labor management 3i changes in certain steps, while x the overall downward trend is nearly the same, and y the overall downward trend is not significantly different, i.e., the slight change in the cost of low inputs does not have a significant effect on the changes in x and y. At the same time, the changes in the benefits of growth needs at low propensity of workers to leave 3m under low inputs of capital labor management and the costs of meeting the growth needs of workers 3j under high inputs of capital labor management do not have a significant effect on the changes in the two probabilities. In addition, there is not much difference between the effect of changes in the returns 3n to growth needs at low propensity to leave for workers under high inputs of capital labor management on the change in x the rate of decline, which is relatively faster the larger 3n the rate of decline, and the greater the rate of decline, which is y relatively faster. The greater the returns to labor under high inputs, the further the attractiveness of returns increases, so the rate of tendency to low propensity to leave is relatively faster. In the labor market supply exceeds demand, capital if still willing to increase the input of labor, which can largely incentivize the laborers, because the laborers can not only ensure a high quality of life, the high productivity of the laborers also at the same time to the capital to bring high returns. Capital labor manages capital gains at low inputs when workers have a low propensity to leave L₂ the larger, x the slower the decline, and the decline tends to be rapid and then slow, while the y rate of decline is almost the same, as shown in Figure 1(a). When the returns to low inputs are more substantial, capital will consider more carefully whether to raise labor management inputs, thus tending to labor management high inputs at a relatively slower rate. At the same time, labor market supply exceeds demand, and most workers will make a quick decision to choose a low propensity to leave their jobs, thus y declining sharply before converging to 0, which in turn affects x declining sharply before converging to 0.

Figure 1.

Numerical simulation of market labor force when supply exceeds demand

Capital gains when workers have a low propensity to leave at high inputs of capital labor management R₂ increase in steps from 60 to 100, and the larger the R₂, the faster x declines, and the faster y declines, as in Figure 1(b). When high inputs imply high returns, capital chooses capital labor management high inputs more rapidly and thus tends to tend to capital labor management high inputs at a relatively fast rate, while workers are incentivized by capital labor management high inputs, which to some extent accelerates the rate of change in the probability of their high turnover propensity. The coefficient of loss of demand satisfaction when laborers have a high propensity to leave r is larger, and y decreases faster, while x there is no significant difference in the rate of decrease, as shown in Figure 1(c). When high propensity to leave implies high loss, and at the same time in the labor market supply is greater than demand for leaving the psychological expected return is low, workers will choose low propensity to leave more quickly, and thus tend to low propensity to leave the rate of relatively fast. Labor market supply exceeds demand, the stability of workers is higher, when the capital is willing to increase investment, for the workers is a great opportunity for development, low tendency to leave the job is the biggest gain. To sum up, when labor market supply exceeds demand, capital should not choose low investment in labor management with inertia thinking that the probability of workers’ high tendency to leave is very small, and they can generate income without increasing investment. On the contrary, capital should carefully measure the direct and indirect value of laborers, and reasonably increase the labor management inputs when their stability is high, so as to obtain high returns with high inputs, which is a good way to implement the idea of historical materialism of Marx and Engels, and avoid the problem of contradictory movement in the relationship between laborers and capital.

The simulation analyzes the sensitivity of the main parameters to the evolution of the game under the stable equilibrium point D(1,1) when the labor market is in oversupply (W=30) and the workers are low psychological capital (S=3) . Keeping the initial parameters unchanged, so that the probability of capital labor management inputs x = 0.58 and the propensity of workers to leave y = 0.58. Adjusting the initial values, the corresponding evolution results are obtained, and the numerical simulation of the market labor force in the time of oversupply is shown in Figure 2. The smaller the capital gain L² at the time of low propensity of workers to leave under low input of capital labor management, x tends to 1 more slowly, and x decreases and then continues to rise for a short period of time at the beginning, while the rate of increase y tends to be consistent, as shown in Fig. 2(a). When the returns to low inputs are low, capital will think twice about whether the knowledge governance low-input strategy is correct, and thus the rate of convergence to capital labor management low inputs will be relatively slow. At the same time, the labor market is in short supply, capital will initially use high inputs to try to reduce the propensity of workers to leave, so x there will be a downward trend at the beginning, however, as workers continue to tend to a high propensity to leave, increasing inputs will increase the loss, resulting in a rapid adjustment of the strategy of the capital, x turn to continue to rise. The labor market is oversupplied, and if capital tries to increase inputs it may not be able to guarantee returns because workers have a higher propensity to leave. Capital returns to labor management at high inputs of labor with a low propensity of workers to leave R² are larger, x rise more slowly, and y there is no significant difference in the rate of increase, as shown in Figure 2(b). When the return to high inputs is high, capital will be more cautious about the implementation of the low input strategy of labor management, and thus the rate of tendency to low inputs of capital labor management will be relatively slow. The smaller the coefficient of loss of demand satisfaction r when labor has a high propensity to leave, the faster both x and y converge to 1, as in Figure 2(c). When the high propensity to leave is accompanied by low losses, and also in the case of high psychological expected gains from leaving in the labor market where demand exceeds supply, workers tend to have a high propensity to leave more quickly, and this further accelerates the evolution of capital toward a low-input strategy for labor management. Capital should understand the tendency of labor to leave in time, and in the face of the workers who can not be retained even under the high investment, it should turn to the low-input strategy, so as to stop the loss in time, and fully implement the economic theory of Marx and Engels’ historical materialist thought and the class labor relations.

Figure 2.

Numerical simulation of market labor when demand exceeds supply

However, when some people are dissatisfied with the initial compensation conditions and find it difficult to reach agreement with the superstructure on their own compensation demands, the people will adopt a more aggressive resistance strategy and become the so-called “nail households”. For the superstructure, has been unable or unwilling to meet these people’s compensation requirements, at the same time, due to the people’s over-aggressive resistance led to the endurance of Tun, the lack of, and the existence of these nail households has affected the progress of land requisition and demolition, and even affect the performance of some members of the superstructure, this time, the superstructure will take violence demolition and relocation of illegal demolition and relocation of the tactics that (illegal demolition and relocation of the dissatisfaction with the compensation). In this case, the people not only can not get higher compensation, but also pay a high price of resistance, for the superstructure is also true, need to pay a higher price of illegal demolition and relocation. Among them:

P Proceeds received by the superstructure when the landless people accept the terms of compensation offered by the superstructure and the demolition is carried out in a harmonious manner.

G is the benefit of the superstructure when the people who lost their land accept the compensation conditions and the superstructure chooses to demolish and relocate the land in a harmonious manner.

B for the people choose to accept the compensation conditions, while the superstructure chooses illegal demolition and relocation, the superstructure of the benefits gained.

N₁ for the loss of benefits to the people when the superstructure chooses to demolish and relocate in violation of the law.

N₂ is the amount of compensation received by the people if they choose to negotiate with the superstructure and the negotiation is successful.

I₁ is the increase in the amount of compensation received by the people if they choose to negotiate with the superstructure and the negotiation is successful.

I₂ is the amount of reduction in the benefits received by the superstructure if the people choose to negotiate with the superstructure and the negotiation is successful.

M₁ is the cost of negotiating with the superstructure if the people are not satisfied with the terms of the compensation and the negotiation is successful.

M₂ is the cost of resistance if the people are not satisfied with the terms of compensation and have not succeeded in negotiating with the superstructure, and the people choose to continue to resist, and M₂ > M₁ is the cost of resistance if the people choose to continue to resist.

Numerical modeling of social conflicts (e.g., land acquisition and relocation conflicts) with the help of evolutionary game models and Matlab R2016b. The details are as follows:

When { I2<N2 M1<I1 , the strategy (0, 1) is an evolutionary stable strategy, that is, in this case, the landless people choose to resist expropriation and demolition, and the superstructure chooses legal expropriation and demolition, and the values of the simulation parameters of the stable strategy (0, 1) are shown in Table L₁ ~ L₃. It can be seen that the three simulation states only change the size of I₁, i.e., the compensation increment of the landless people, to investigate whether the higher the compensation given to the people, the more the people will tend to comply with the expropriation and demolition. The three simulation states are input into the software respectively, and the strategy (0, 1) simulation evolution path is shown in Figure 3. The results of the simulation are consistent with the results of the replicated dynamic equation analysis in the previous section. The final stabilization strategy in this case is that the people choose to resist expropriation and demolition, while the superstructure chooses to negotiate with the people. However, according to the comparison of the three evolutionary states, it can be seen that when I₁ is larger (the closer the value is to 1), i.e., the higher the superstructure raises the increment of compensation for expropriation and demolition, the shorter the time taken by the people tends to choose to resist expropriation and demolition, and the more it deviates from the ideal stabilizing evolutionary strategy. In other words, it is not the case that the more compensation the superstructure gives away to the people when they are resistant, the more satisfied the people will be with the superstructure’s behavior.

Figure 3.

Stability strategy (0,1) simulation evolution path

Second, when N₂ < B, the strategy (1, 0) is an evolutionary stable strategy, that is, in this case the landless people choose to comply with the expropriation and demolition, and the superstructure chooses to demolish illegally. The values of each parameter involved in the simulation process are shown in Table 3, and the simulation evolution path is shown in Figure 4. The results of the simulation are consistent with the results of the replicated dynamic equation analysis in the previous section. The final stabilization strategy in this case is that the people choose to comply with the expropriation and demolition, while the superstructure chooses to violate the law. However, according to the comparison of the three evolutionary states, it can be seen that when I₁ is larger (when 0 increases by 1), i.e., when the people are dissatisfied with the compensation proposed by the superstructure and hope to get higher compensation, the higher the possibility that the superstructure raises the incremental amount of compensation for expropriation and demolition, the longer the people tend to choose to obey expropriation and demolition, the more reluctant they are to choose to obey expropriation and demolition, and the more likely that they will deviate from the ideal stabilizing evolutionary strategy. In other words, it is not the case that the more compensation the superstructure gives away to the people when they are resistant, the more satisfied the people will be with the superstructure’s behavior.

Figure 4.

Simulation evolution path

When { I1<M1 B<N2 , the strategy (1, 0) is an evolutionary stabilizing strategy. The values of the simulation parameters of the stabilizing strategy (0, 1) are shown in Table 4, and the simulation path of the stabilizing strategy (0, 1) is shown in Fig. 5. The results of the simulation are consistent with the results of the replicated dynamic equation analysis in the previous section. The final stabilization strategy in this case is that the people choose to comply with the expropriation and demolition, while the superstructure chooses legal expropriation and demolition. However, according to the comparison of the three evolutionary states, it can be seen that when I₁ is larger (closer to 1.0), i.e., when the people are dissatisfied with the compensation proposed by the superstructure and hope for higher compensation, the higher the possibility of the superstructure to raise the increment of compensation for expropriation and demolition, the longer the people tend to choose to submit to expropriation and demolition, the more reluctant they are to choose to submit to expropriation and demolition, and the more likely that they will deviate from the ideal stabilizing evolutionary strategy. In other words, it is not the case that the more compensation the superstructure gives away to the people when they are resistant, the more satisfied the people will be with the superstructure’s behavior.

Figure 5.

Stability strategy (1,1) simulation evolution path

In summary, the study of people’s satisfaction is essential in the process of conflict resolution of land acquisition and relocation, because the absolute voice of the superstructure makes it difficult to make decisions objectively, so it must start from the people who have lost their land. The exploration of people’s satisfaction with land acquisition and relocation has two main roles in the process of conflict resolution. First of all, the diversification of compensation conditions for land requisition and relocation requires us to sort out various conditions and analyze the degree of importance, so that we can have a target in the process of formulating policies, and the degree of importance of various compensation conditions must be judged from the degree of acceptance and satisfaction of the people. Secondly, the exploration of the satisfaction of the people who have lost their land in a land requisition and relocation project can let the superstructure objectively understand the advantages and shortcomings of the land requisition and relocation work, which is convenient to control the land requisition and relocation project after the fact, and it can also refine and sublimate the conclusions into the management of the next land requisition and relocation project, which can form a benign cycle. Therefore, in order to fundamentally solve the contradiction of land requisition and relocation, it is necessary to obey the Marx and Engels historical materialism thought, so that the labor relations between the superstructure and the people can be eased. It not only reveals the Marx Engels historical materialism thought, but also improves the people’s cognitive level of the relevant theory.